Qutbism provided a political ideology that introduced Islamic supremacism and nationalism, and that rejects many aspects of modern Muslim society and political regimes. The Islamic State believes that local populations must be converted to true Islam and that Muslims can accuse one another of apostasy without adhering to traditional clerical criteria, which stipulate a series of verification measures to ensure the apostasy of an accused person.
They have to be forced at first. You have a ready project, you should place it on society like a tooth crown and make sure to maintain it. According to Egyptian researcher Hussam Tammam, the Muslim Brotherhood influenced Salafism through at least two channels.
The first was the ideas of Qutb, represented by ideologues such as Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian-born leader of the jihad in Afghanistan. This current can be discerned in the ranks of Syrian rebel groups that until made up the Islamic Front, in the group of clerics known as the Syrian Islamic Council, and, to some extent, in the Nusra Front, the al-Qaeda-affiliated group fighting in Syria. Increasingly, Salafism has shifted from being a dawa proselytism movement to a political ideology.
The influence of Salafism on political Islam and vice versa led to varying outcomes—broadly referred to by its adherents as haraki Salafism, or activist Salafism. In Saudi Arabia and Egypt, some who adopted formulations of these ideas went on to fight jihad in Afghanistan; this included, notably, Osama bin Laden.
A vast number of modern jihadists have cited the influence of Islamist ideas next to their study of Salafism, including, arguably, the true spiritual father of the Islamic State, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The vanguard of activist Salafism transformed Salafi concepts, it did not just borrow them.
This fourth criterion was a defining contribution to the Sahwa and to Salafi-jihadi thought in general. The Islamic State and al-Qaeda diverge ideologically, but the former continues to rely heavily on the jihadi literature used by al-Qaeda. The Islamic State lacks the religious resources, in terms of committed preachers, both within and outside its territories to develop its own jihadi school reflecting its intense sectarianism.
The same marriage of ideas that helped produce the al-Qaeda generation in the s also produced more conservative Islamist movements that are politically active without endorsing violent jihadism, indiscriminate killing, or genocide.
Religious intellectuals such as Kuwaiti Hakim al-Mutairi, for example, called for progressive Salafi ideas, including a multiparty democracy, citing Salafi references.
Although the intertwining of Salafism and political Islam has led to diverse outcomes, most reflect a key feature of Salafism: its propensity to narrowly define who is a Muslim. This makes Salafism sectarian almost by definition. But on political and cultural questions, their view of the world tended toward that of the Muslim Brotherhood, although it was partly reformulated in terms derived from the Wahhabi tradition. The Islamic State combines ideas such as wala wal bara loyalty to Islam and disavowal of un-Islamic ways and apostasy with a religious penal code to form a political ideology and a worldview actively classifying and excommunicating fellow Muslims.
The Islamic State is part of a legacy of takfiri schools and ideas to emerge from al-Qaeda. But while the Islamic State was once affiliated with al-Qaeda, the two groups have ideologically parted ways.
Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi differed when they were in Afghanistan in the s, as their successors do today, on the use of extreme violence and the targeting of Shia civilians.
The group argues that focusing on the far enemy the West and ignoring the near enemy Muslim enemies in the region, especially Shia is ineffective. This scenario has, in fact, played out since Islamic State fighters took over the northern Iraqi city of Mosul in June , drawing more than 60 countries to the fight against the group. The Iraq war in provided space for al-Zarqawi to spread his sectarian vision. For al-Qaeda, such a focus on Shia would distract from the fight against the West.
Furthermore, mainstream Sunni clergy reject a genocidal attitude toward the Shia public. Bin Laden reportedly favored an alliance between Shia and Sunni groups that would position them to jointly attack the West. According to a letter published by the U.
State Department, al-Zarqawi urged bin Laden to focus on Shia. If things appear otherwise to you, we are brothers, and the disagreement will not spoil [our] friendship. He cited religious and practical reasons for al-Qaeda in Iraq to steer clear of targeting the Shia public and places of worship. This is the consensus of the Sunni toward the Shia public and ignorant followers. Al-Qaeda officially disassociated itself from the Islamic State in February Generally, outside Islamic State—held territories, the Islamic State has failed to win the support of any prominent jihadi ideologues, with the exception of a few jihadi clerics.
Its refusal to bend creates a culture of takfirism within takfirism , where any leniency is forbidden. In a video interview posted online in October , Sami al-Aridi—the top cleric of the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front—explained some of the ideas that differentiate the Islamic State from other jihadi groups, including al-Qaeda. In contrast, the Islamic State considers clerics a key factor in the persistence of tyrannical, illegitimate governments in the Muslim world.
The Islamic State believes that tabayun a process of investigation is sometimes needed to determine whether a person is a true Muslim.
According to al-Aridi, the Islamic State declares a Muslim to be kafir an infidel or unbeliever based on intuitive suspicion, consequentiality, and vagueness. For the Islamic State, ordinary Muslims receive their religious education from clerics who are aligned with corrupt Muslim rulers who perpetuate Western hegemony.
Accordingly, the Islamic State prioritizes the fight against clerics and rulers over the fight against the West. The Islamic State deems a person who adheres to these traditions to be respectful of the Prophet and those who do not adhere to the traditions to be disrespectful. This view was also popular among followers of Juhayman al-Utaybi, a Saudi extremist who seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca along with his followers in November and declared himself the Mahdi an expected messiah in Islam.
According to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, religious followers of al-Utaybi would often pray in a mosque with their shoes on, and would take them off as they leave the mosque, as the Prophet Muhammad had reportedly done on occasions.
The Islamic State is also extreme in its application of the Salafi concept of nawaqid al-Islam , or nullifiers of Islam. These are a set of conditions with which doctrinaire Salafists believe all Muslims must comply.
A written, codified law would provide a check on the excesses of executive power. The arbitrary whims of corrupt rulers would give way to something resembling the rule of law. As Noah Feldman argues in The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State , historically it was a self-regulating clerical class that, as keepers of God-given law, ensured that the caliph was bound by something beyond himself.
Instead, they hoped to introduce consultative mechanisms and institutions to balance the burgeoning power of the executive. The other contribution of Islamic modernism was to recognize the state, and state power, as a political fact.
Since the state had more responsibilities—providing education and healthcare, regulating mass media, and concerning itself with family planning—it needed to have more discretion in public policymaking. Islamic modernists and mainstream Islamists alike made an effective distinction between matters of faith and creed, which were unchangeable, and matters of policy, which were not.
If something was in the public interest, or maslaha , then it could probably be justified. If prohibitions on usury stood in the way of, say, an IMF loan, then there would have to be a way around it.
Islamists needed to build in this flexibility. Indeed, ultraconservative Salafis , themselves a rather diverse bunch, regularly castigate the Muslim Brotherhood and its fellow travelers for putting the demands of politics over the requirements of faith. The Brotherhood, in this respect, is a heterodox and reformist intellectual and political movement.
Of course, it is also inherently illiberal. What would become Protestantism was inextricably linked to the advent of mass literacy, as a growing number of believers were no longer dependent on the intercession of clerics. With the New Testament translated for the first time into German and other European languages, the faithful could directly access the text on their own.
The Muslim world, by comparison, has already experienced a weakening of the clerics, who, in being co-opted by newly independent states, fell into disrepute.
In Europe, the decline of the clerical class and mass literacy laid the groundwork for secularization. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood disproportionately drew its leadership from the professional sectors of medicine, engineering, and law. Thus the mutual affairs those pertaining to governance should be conducted only by mutual consultation which in contemporary political parlance will be construed as democratic governance. The Qur'an is thus against totalitarian or monarchical rule.
Verse of the Qur'an is a very important verse in laying down the guidance for governance. It is a divine statement against dictatorship or authoritarianism.
The verse reads: "Thus it is by Allah's mercy that thou art gentle on them. And hadst thou been rough, hard-hearted, they would certainly would have dispersed from around thee. So pardon them and ask protection for them, and consult them in important matters This verse has been addressed to the Prophet and no imam from his family can deviate from this divine injunction.
Thus even an imam from the Prophet's family cannot be absolutist and has to base his rule on democratic principles. Thus also even the Shi'ah theory of imamah cannot lead to absolutist or purely personal rule. Also, an imam can be infallible in religious matters, in laying down religious rulings. But in all secular and worldly matters he will be bound by democratic structures of governance. Secondly, the theory of imamah was much more relevant to the close relatives of the Prophet who lived either during his time or very close to his period.
Today, more than fourteen hundred years after the death of the holy Prophet, no one can claim such physical closeness to the Prophet and its resultant benefits. And even within the first century of the Prophet's death there were many claimants for the office of Imam. The Shi'ahs were divided into a number of sects and sub-sects.
Fourteen hundred years after the death of the Prophet who can determine the authenticity of the claimant to the office of the imamah? The twelve Shi'ahs and also the Isma'ili-Mustalian Shi'ahs believe in seclusion of their respective imams. No wonder then that Iran adopted the elective principle of governance, which is the ultimate aim of the Islamic scripture. Also, once Islam spread to vast areas of the world outside the confines of Arabia new ethnic and racial groups were added to its fold.
This proved both the strength as well as weakness of the Islamic society. Strength as far as rich diversity was concerned and weakness as far as complex problem and group conflicts it gave rise to. The group conflicts became greatly intensified even within the limited period of Khilafat-i-Rashidah which lasted for slightly less than thirty years. During this period, a number of groups came into existence. The most powerful group was of the tribe of Quraysh who were muhajirs immigrants to Madina to which they migrated along with, or after the Prophet, to avoid persecution in Mecca.
They claimed to be the sabiqun al-awwalun those who responded to the call of Islam earlier than others and also belonged to the tribe of the Prophet. After the death of the Prophet they also came out with the doctrine that the Khilafat be confined to the tribe of Quraysh. However, the Quraysh was divided into several clans of which the clans of Hashim to which the Prophet himself belonged and of Banu Umayyah were at loggerheads.
Among the Qurayshites the Hashimites and the Umayyads fought against each other for the leadership of the nascent Muslim state. Ali and his sons particularly Hasan and Husain who were claimants to the leadership all belonged to the clan of Banu Hashim. Then there were Ansars those who belonged to the tribes of Aws and Khazraj of Madina and who had helped the Prophet by swearing allegiance to the Prophet and helping him hence Ansars i.
The Ansars also claimed leadership of the state after the death of the Prophet on the basis that they had helped the Prophet and that without their help his mission would not have survived. But the Qurayshites strongly resisted their claim to the Khilafat. Then the leaders of the Ansars proposed a compromise and said let one from the Quraysh and one from the Ansars share the leadership but this was also turned down by the Qurayshites that it would lead to more conflict and confusion.
Islam had tried to usher in a just society based on compassion, sensitivity towards other fellow human beings, equality and human dignity. However, the well entrenched vested interests, though paying lip service to these values, in practice sabotage them in various ways and continue to impose their own hegemony. The weaker sections and the downtrodden attracted by the revolutionary thrust of Islam and its sensitivity towards them felt disillusioned and revolted.
This revolt brought about near anarchy in society and resulted in civil war in which thousands were killed. Ultimately the Umayyads captured power and Khilafat was converted into monarchy. Thus we see that the Islamic society went through great deal of turmoil and bloodshed and could not evolve a universally acceptable form of state.
When the Abbasids overthrew Umayyads in the first half of the second century of Islam, there again was great deal of bloodshed. When the Abbasids captured power, some Umayyads fled to Spain and established their own rule there.
Two Caliphs simultaneously existed. Their considerable firepower helped them overrun Kurdish Peshmerga positions in northern Iraq in August and the Iraqi army in Ramadi in May The militant group is believed to be the world's wealthiest. It initially relied on wealthy private donors and Islamic charities in the Middle East keen to oust Syria's President Assad. Although such funding is still being used to finance the travel of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, the group is now largely self-funding.
But air strikes on oil-related infrastructure are now believed to have diminished such revenue. IS is believed to raise at least several million dollars per month by robbing, looting, and extortion.
Payments are extracted from those who pass through, conduct business in, or simply live in IS territory under the auspices or providing services or "protection". Religious minorities are forced to pay a special tax. IS profits from raiding banks, selling antiquities, and stealing or controlling sales of livestock and crops. Abducted girls and women have meanwhile been sold as sex slaves.
Islamic State: Who supports the jihadist group? Iraq and Syria: The hostages. IS members are jihadists who adhere to an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam and consider themselves the only true believers. They hold that the rest of the world is made up of unbelievers who seek to destroy Islam, justifying attacks against other Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Beheadings, crucifixions and mass shootings have been used to terrorise their enemies. IS members have justified such atrocities by citing the Koran and Hadith , but Muslims have denounced them. Even al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who disavowed IS in February over its actions in Syria, warned Zarqawi in that such brutality loses "Muslim hearts and minds".
Why is 'Islamic State' so violent? Amnesty International report. Image source, AP.
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